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From International Law to International Conflicts of Law:
The Fragmentation of Legitimacy
Harlan Grant Cohen*
From Fragmenting Doctrine to Fragmenting Communities
Oftentimes, the potential fragmentation of international law is treated as a
doctrinal or technical problem. It is assumed that those interpreting the rules within
human rights, or international investment law, or international criminal law are working
from the same set of sources, and disagree only on issues of interpretation and
application. Under this view, if we could find a means of choosing between
interpretations, perhaps a rule of treaty interpretation1 or even an appeals court of
international law, or if we could devise doctrinal tweaks that could reconcile these
interpretations, for example, a new interpretation of the opinio juris requirement for
customary international law, these fragmentation problems would disappear. This view
essentially treats conflicts between human rights and trade the way we would treat
conflicts between contracts or torts in domestic law—both are part of the same legal
system, and as such, the system can provide doctrines to reconcile or choose between
them.
In this presentation, which is based on a longer paper, I challenge both this
conventional view of fragmentation and the basic notion that there is a single
international law community with a single doctrine of sources. I argue that despite our
constant invocation of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and
the traditional doctrine of sources, it is not at all clear that the legal actors in these
different subject areas actually agree on the legitimate sources of international law. On
the contrary, what the problem of fragmentation reveals is that a single international law
community is actually being replaced by separate, overlapping legal communities with
significantly different views on law and legitimacy. These communities disagree on the
very “who” and “how” of international lawmaking, and as such, debates between these
communities—between human rights and international humanitarian law or between
trade law and environmental law—often represent debates over legitimacy rather than
conflicts over interpretation.
Reframing the problem as a debate over legitimate process helps us better
understand our options for resolving it. To the extent these debates are debates about
legitimacy, they will not be resolved with doctrinal fixes. Instead, they must essentially
be viewed as conflicts of law. Resolving those debates will require finding ways to
mediate between the demands of different legal communities.
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Getting to the Source(s) of the Problem
This paper is not the first to suggest that fragmentation may be the result of
fragmenting normative-legal communities. Legal pluralists like Gunther Teubner2 and
Paul Berman3 have made similar suggestions. This paper gets to this conclusion,
however, in a novel way. It does so by tracing the problem to its source, taking a fresh
look at the doctrine of sources itself.
In an earlier article,4 I argued that the time has come to rethink the list of sources
in Article 38 of the ICJ statute, i.e., treaties, custom, and general principles. I argued that
if we draw upon what we have learned about how law works over the last century since
the doctrine of sources was first codified—lessons from H.L.A. Hart’s socio-legal theory,
from law and society scholarship, from international compliance theory—we start to
move away from a doctrine of sources based on the form a particular rule takes (whether
it is a treaty or a custom) to a doctrine of sources based on the processes through which
rules come to be treated as law. Drawing particularly on compliance and social norms
theories, I argue that rules come to be treated as international law in one of two ways.
First, some rules will be directly internalized by international actors. Although some of
these rules will be substantive—states may internalize a prohibition on genocide or
slavery—others which we might term “legitimacy rules,” will focus on process—they
may explain what counts as a binding agreement, what evidence is needed to legitimate a
customary practice as law, or dictate when such an agreement must be followed.
Essentially these internalized legitimacy rules provide standards against which purported
rules will be judged. They also help define the legal community. The legal community
can be thought of as that group which shares a certain set of “legitimacy rules.” A second
category of rules treated as international law, “legitimated rules,” builds on this first one.
Rules in this category are treated as law because they satisfy the internalized legitimacy
rules. Thus, as an example, some human rights may be treated as international law
because those rights have simply been internalized, while others may be treated as
international law because they’re embodied in a document that meets internalized
standards of legitimacy.
Looking at sources this way allows us to take a closer look at fragmentation and
see what really is going on. When looked at through the lens of this revised doctrine of
sources, at least some disputes over international law appear to be disputes about
legitimacy rules. In a number of areas, the legal community appears to be changing,
sometimes to include actors others than states. As the community has transformed, so too
has its internalized understandings of what constitutes legitimate rulemaking.
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International human rights law, Global Administrative Law, and the law applied
in tribunal-centered areas of law provide three examples of communities that appear to be
developing in this way. In each of these areas of law, rules have developed that cannot
easily be squared with traditional doctrine. In human rights law, we have the emergence
of “instant” custom, the notion that customary international law can be proven based on
what states say, traditional evidence of opinio juris, even in the absence of state practice,
or possibly in the presence of state practice to the contrary. Similarly, within human
rights law, the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights has claimed not only the authority to determine whether a reservation is
in line with treaty’s objects and purpose and valid, but also that where invalid, a state will
be bound by the whole treaty including the provision it attempted to reserve. Both are
significant departures from traditional doctrine and its traditional justifications in state
consent. Scholars of Global Administrative Law have observed that various transnational
regulatory regimes—some public, some private, some legal, some non-legal—have
begun to adopt similar rules regarding transparency, participation, reason-giving, and
means-end proportionality, rules that cannot easily be traced to formal sources of
international law. And, in tribunal-intensive areas of international law like international
criminal law and international investment arbitration, the use of precedent has become
widespread, despite suggestions in Article 38 to the contrary.
Although each of these has been treated as a doctrinal problem, each seems better
explained by shifting international law communities and shifting notions of legitimacy.
In human rights law, it has long been recognized that individuals now play some role as
members of the legal community. It makes sense that as that legal community has
developed to include individuals, expert bodies, and advocacy groups as well as states,
legitimacy rules based solely on state consent would lose some force and need to be
replaced. In the case of human rights, it appears that a new legitimacy rule has emerged,
one that says that state promises matter and that states cannot vitiate those promises
merely through state action to the contrary. Similarly, the emerging rules of Global
Administrative Law seem best explained as responses to the legitimacy rules internalized
by overlapping communities of regulators and stakeholders. Finally, the use of precedent
seems like a response by a tribunal-centered legal community—one made up of judges,
lawyers, victims, and violators—to a need for neutral, predictable rules in areas where
traditional state practice may be underdeveloped or unreliable.
From Conflicts of Norms to Conflicts of Law to Conflicts of Legitimacy
Assuming that this account is persuasive, it suggests some lessons about the
problem of fragmentation.
To the extent these disputes are about legitimate
rulemaking—the “who” and “how” of international law—we are not going to be able
stitch things back together with doctrinal fixes. Instead, we are going to need to treat
these conflicts as ones between different systems of law and search for rules that can
mediate between the concerns of these different communities.
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Working out these rules is a particularly vexing problem, something that will
undoubtedly fuel future projects. Analogies to conflicts between subject areas within a
single legal regime and analogies to conflicts between the laws of different states both
seem inappropriate to these disputes between overlapping legal communities. Four broad
approaches seem to suggest themselves, each with their own benefits and drawbacks.
One would be a conservative/common denominator approach. Such an approach would
recognize that Article 38 no longer describes international law but nonetheless use it as a
conflicts rule: All disputes between different communities will have to be funneled
through traditional doctrine. Such an approach recognizes the continued role of states in
all these communities, controls the pace of legal change, and provides a focal point
communities can use to influence each other. A second, more radical approach would
favor the rule of the most inclusive community, the one in which the most stakeholders
could have their voices heard. Such an approach seems normatively appealing, but
requires difficult, perhaps impossible analyses of contestable terms like “more inclusive”
or “more legitimate.” A third managerial or pluralist approach, would try to preserve
community autonomy through margins of appreciation, subsidiarity, or complementarity.
The problem with such an approach is that figuring out how those doctrines should apply
is notoriously difficult. Finally, a competition approach would suggest that the best
conflict rule is no conflicts rule, that these disputes can and should spur longer-term
political and moral debates, and that competition may allow better results to emerge.
Such an approach depends, however, on valuing the future over the present and on a
confidence in the eventual outcome of these disputes.
Conclusion
Fragmentation is more than just a technical challenge for international scholars; it
is a challenge to our most deeply held assumptions about the nature of international law.
Moving forward will require us to confront the fragmentation of community, sources, and
legitimacy fueling that challenge.
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